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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF EXECUTIVE
“INABILITY”
Fred F. Fielding*
I would like to thank you, Dean Feerick, for the invitation to speak here
today and also for the impact that you have brought to so many important
works related to our public governance and the enhancement of the public
trust. We’re all very honored to be in your presence at any time for that.
Also, as all the panelists know, I would like to make humble reference to
your persuasive ways of getting people to do what you would like them to
do.
As this symposium lineup illustrates, we are very fortunate that some of
the most recognized legal scholars have dedicated many hours—actually,
many years—of time and effort to research and to think about this
important issue of continuity of government, and especially continuity of
the presidency. I would be remiss in failing also to personally, as well as
publicly, acknowledge and thank the distinguished Senator Birch Bayh,
with whom I have had the wonderful experience of working on this subject
and others, but also for his authorship and his foresight and stewardship for
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
I have been blessed by opportunities for public service. I hope that
everyone who has the opportunity seizes it. Although it can be frightening
sometimes, it can also be very personally rewarding. Particularly, I have
been blessed to serve in the Office of the President for three different
administrations, as Dean Feerick mentioned, as well as a Commissioner to
study the tragic events of September 11.
But until preparing my thoughts for today’s talk, I really didn’t realize
and focus on the irony that in each of the three tours of duty at the White
House, I have witnessed the invocation, the implementation, and/or the
serious contemplation of various aspects of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
Each of them has had a chapter in the Amendment’s history. I further
realized that I was not only involved in the first exercise of Section 2 [of the
Amendment]—when Spiro Agnew’s replacement was sent to Congress—
but also the first time that the provisions of Section 3 were observed, albeit
reluctantly and ambiguously, by President Reagan. I also was involved in
* Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP; Counsel to Presidents Ronald Reagan and
George W. Bush.
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the only known situation where historians have argued that maybe the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment should have been exercised.
So as—I guess I’ll call myself—an eyewitness in each instance, and later
in the seemingly routine exercise of Section 3 by President George W. Bush
in 2007, I’m especially pleased, after watching the excellent scholarship
that was presented this morning, to spend some time with you to provide a
view from ground zero on our subject matter.
It goes without saying that the issue of executive continuity has a
paramount importance, increasingly so in today’s ages, the nuclear age and
also the age of terror. The gravity of the issue, and the virtues and the
complexities of the existing structures that we have, has not only been a
topic for scholastic endeavors, but, as everyone knows, they have found
their way to stage and screen. In the last ten years, I would suspect that the
two most popular and watched drama shows are The West Wing and 24.
Both dealt with the topic. Indeed, 24 did on several occasions—or several
“days,” I guess I should say.
So this morning and this afternoon, and then again tomorrow, we are
going to be treated to well-informed discussions regarding the ambiguities
of the current constitutional arrangements. However, notably, the TwentyFifth Amendment itself was a long overdue attempt to resolve some of the
areas in which, it’s fair to say, in retrospect, our Founders seemingly had
the capacity to be more precise, but were not so, in the case of Article II,
Section 1 [of the Constitution].
My point being that the Constitution, as originally ratified, failed to make
it clear how or who would determine whether a President possessed the
“inability,” which was referenced, to discharge those powers and duties of
the President, and whether, upon relieving the President in the case of
death, resignation, or such inability, the Vice President would necessarily
serve as the President as opposed to the Acting President.1 It’s to the great
testimony of leaders at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, and perhaps to
fate, that the Republic functioned for almost two centuries without these
and other attendant problems officially resolved.
For those of you who are just joining us and didn’t have the benefit of
this morning, during those two centuries, Congress adjusted the laws of
succession, eventually settling on the framework adopted in the
[Presidential] Succession Act of 1947,2 in which the path from the Vice
President would run through the leaders of each of the houses of Congress
before reentering the President’s Cabinet. There are interesting debates—
we heard them this morning and we’ll hear them again, I’m sure—as to the
pros and cons for that.
Nonetheless, while that was going on, within the executive branch
periods of temporary inability to function were really handled on an ad hoc
1. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 657–58 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) (reproducing the Constitution as produced by the federal convention, specifically
Article II, section 1, clause 6).
2. Pub. L. No. 80-199, 61 Stat. 380 (1947) (codified as amended at 3 U.S.C. § 19
(2006)).
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basis by nonbinding memoranda of understanding between the President
and the Vice President. Following the Kennedy assassination, however,
and tense episodes such as the Cuban Missile Crisis that made a nuclear
threat to our citizenry and our government suddenly all too real, leaders
such as Senator Bayh rightly understood that the ad hoc solutions were no
longer sufficient.
Thus, we are discussing today the result of that concern: the TwentyFifth Amendment. While it did not address all plausible, conceivable
contingencies, it has proven to be a critical addition to our nation’s
governing framework.
I mentioned that, ironically, I was witness to the relevancy of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment in all three terms in which I served in the White
House. This included the first invocation of Section 2 of the Amendment in
1973 with the resignation of the Vice President and the nomination of
Gerald Ford two days later. I was thirty-four years old, and there I was
dealing with the Constitution. That would be the first of two applications,
as we all know. While I left in February, thereafter President Ford would,
in turn, nominate Nelson Rockefeller, upon President Nixon’s resignation.
But the use of Sections 1 and 2 in 1973 and 1974 played an important
role in our government. These were very unsettled and very unsettling
periods of time. Unlike Sections 3 and 4, Section 2 has relatively little
discretion and interpretation, apart from the need for the President to choose
a candidate who could be confirmed by Congress. But requiring
congressional approval for the Vice Presidential replacement added a
democratic element and a responsible connection to the voting public at this
time, when there was understandable distrust of the executive branch and of
government at large.
The first two months of my service as Counsel to the President for
Ronald Reagan provided, really, the first serious consideration of the
invocation of Section 3. It was on March 30, 1981, just over seventy days
into a new administration. President Reagan delivered a mid-afternoon
speech to the AFL-CIO Building Trades Council at the Washington Hilton.
That was the kind of speech and the type of audience that epitomized the
breadth of the Reagan coalitions and the spirit of his presidency, to be sure,
but it was also so routine that very few on the White House senior staff
even wanted to attend. It was just an early afternoon speech.
Back at the White House, it was a normal day of operations—or at least
as normal as things can be in a new administration with an ambitious
agenda. We all recall with clarity when we first learned that JFK had been
shot. I must tell you, as Counsel to the President, you always imagine that
that same thing might or could happen on your watch, but you still don’t
expect that it will, when it does. As I recall, I was in my office, meeting
with the Deputy Attorney General about God-knows-what. About 2:30, I
got a call from the Secret Service saying that there had been a shooting at
the Hilton and that the motorcade was on its way back to the White House,
and immediately thereafter, got a notice that the motorcade had diverted to
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G.W. Hospital. So we all kind of knew at that point that something else had
happened.
To provide a little context to you—this was 1981, almost thirty years
ago—one of the aspects to keep in mind when you revisit that day is that we
have come a long way technologically from where we were thirty years
ago. Everyone that prepared for this knows that there is a book by Herbert
Abrams.3 I will say, at least in this instance, he had it right, when he said
that probably the first phone call to the White House was from a pay phone,
telling them that there had been a shooting. There were no cell phones, no
BlackBerries, no text messaging that we all so rely on now. There were
telexes and pagers and “walkie-talkies,” but that’s really not equivalent to
what we are talking about here. The first and only twenty-four-hour news
channel was CNN, which was our first source of information, when we
gathered in the Situation Room later. That was just about as new as the
administration itself. This was all a new, different technology.
Upon word of the shooting and that the President had actually been hit, I
called the National Security Adviser. He started to assemble people in the
Situation Room, which is, of course, the secure facility within the White
House complex. That’s a logical place to gather. Remember, given that the
source and the scope of the shooting was totally unknown, we didn’t know
if this was a conspiracy or if this was part of something else. Recall at the
time that the Cold War was still cold, and it was one of the chillier phases
of the Cold War during that period of time. There was the growing concern
that the Soviets would react aggressively to the Solidarity strike that had
just occurred in Poland. So there was a tension in our dealings in
international events.
The group that gathered in the Situation Room that day consisted of ten
or more individuals, people leaving and coming at various points. It wasn’t
a full Cabinet meeting, but rather an ad hoc assembly of people. In addition
to myself and the National Security Adviser, Defense Secretary [Caspar]
Weinberger was there; Secretary of State Al[exander] Haig, whom we’ll
make reference to a little later, was there; the Attorney General, William
French Smith; Donald Regan, who at that time was the Treasury Secretary;
Transportation Secretary Drew Lewis was there; and domestic advisers
were there. Dan Murphy, who was the Vice President’s Chief of Staff, was
there, as well as the White House press people. David Gergen, whom you
have seen in more recent iterations, was in and out, because he was dealing
with the press corps, along with the Deputy Press Secretary, Larry Speakes.
Several other White House people went in and out. Our Press Secretary
was among those shot at the Hilton.
Significantly, at that point, the Vice President was not in the city. At that
time, the White House staff had what was called the troika. You had the
Chief of Staff, who was James A. Baker; you had the Counselor to the
3. HERBERT L. ABRAMS, “THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN SHOT”: CONFUSION, DISABILITY,
AND THE 25TH AMENDMENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF
RONALD REAGAN (1992).
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President, who was a very close confidante of the President’s, Edwin
Meese, who later became the Attorney General; and a gentleman named
Michael Deaver, who was the Deputy Chief of Staff and, really, the
President’s eyes and ears, from the First Family point of view. They were
all at the hospital with the President and the First Lady.
I suspect that there really wasn’t any realization, when they were at the
hospital, of the severity of the President’s injuries. There certainly wasn’t
any during that day in the Situation Room. As I said, the Vice President
was away. He was in the air over Texas when the shooting first occurred.
He had initially been informed of the shooting, but not that the President
had been hit, because initially we didn’t know the President had been hit.
Anyway, he had already turned around and was headed back to
Washington.
Most of the news that we were getting was not coming from the Secret
Service in the Situation Room. It was coming from the television. There
was one television overhead, and that’s where we were getting most of our
news. And in all due respect, it wasn’t always accurate. For instance, one
network reported that Press Secretary James Brady, who had been shot,
had, in fact, died. There was a moment of silence in the Situation Room,
and tears were abundant. Jim Brady was a very popular guy. But, in fact,
he hadn’t died.
The scene in the Situation Room, if I could try to describe it, was
obviously apprehensive but it wasn’t harried or frantic. Again, go back to
context. The people that were in the room were professionals. The Cabinet
had only recently been assembled. These were people that had come from
different backgrounds. Some people came from the President’s California
retinue and his governor’s team. Others were former Nixon Administration
officials. Some were brand new to the whole thing. In all fairness, this was
a roomful of strangers who really operated fairly well together under these
circumstances.
While no one approached me or the Attorney General with any requests
for papers sufficient to exercise Section 3 or 4 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment during the time I was there, I had prepared such papers and had
them with me. I had them with me in draft, for both Section 3 and Section
4 coverage.
Also, to be frank with you—and this may be something Senator Bayh
was referring to earlier—when I reviewed the provisions of the TwentyFifth Amendment with the people that were in that room, their eyes glazed
over. Most of them didn’t have a sense of that obligation, though some
obviously, did. The Attorney General certainly did after being briefed by
his staff. Given the remarks that have now become very famous that were
made that day, the line of succession was equally opaque to some people.
Of course, that was the famous, or infamous, day for Al Haig. In fairness to
Secretary of State Haig, he clearly thought at that time that he was
providing reassurance to the American public. The Deputy Press Secretary
had just walked into the pressroom. He was inexperienced. Somebody
asked him who was in charge, and he said, “I don’t know.” Haig, watching
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that on our television, bolted out, ran up two flights of steps—Haig had had
three heart attacks and he smoked about three packs a day—he walked in,
breathless, and made his famous statements.
As I say, in fairness, I think he was trying to provide reassurance to the
nation. His remark was that he was “in control at the White House, pending
the return of the Vice President,” end of quote. However, later there was a
confrontation in the Situation Room, and he would later acknowledge—
although certainly not at that moment—to me that his legal premise was
inaccurate. But what had happened was, when he was asked by the press
beyond what he had said, “Who’s making the decisions?” He indicated—
and this is a quote—“Constitutionally . . . you have the President, the Vice
President, and the Secretary of State, in that order.”4
So, first, apart from history as we know it, the Speaker of the House and
the President pro tem have always preceded the Secretary of State and any
of our Cabinet members in the line of succession. As an administrative
matter, the Secretary of State was the senior administration person in the
room at that time. But that’s not what he said. Secretary of Defense
Weinberger and he had a very famous confrontation in the Situation Room
when he came back. It was a sharp exchange. Weinberger’s point was—
and it was valid—that Secretary Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, was in
charge of the national chain of command. It went from the Commander-inChief to him. He had already upped our DEFCONs to the level that he
thought was necessary, because we had no idea if this was a conspiracy, the
beginning of an international event, or what it was.
That really was controlling the subject at hand, and this had been the
subject of a very intense debate a few weeks before within the
administration, but predominantly between the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of State. The Secretary of State did not prevail in that debate.
That made the exchange even sharper.
As an aside, I should tell you—what I started to mention before—one of
the first things that I did when I became Counsel to President Reagan was
to put my staff to work on preparing a book. It was going to be a
comprehensive book. It was really kind of an emergency manual, which
detailed every possible scenario that we could think of for presidential
inability or even vice presidential inability. The book had not been
completed on March 30, but the letters for Sections 3 and 4 had been
completed, and that’s what I had in my hand.
Later, when it was completed—again, as an aside—whenever I would
travel with the President, I always carried the book with me and I always
had a copy back in the safe. The book basically, as I said, contemplated
every situation you could imagine. This was, in fact, passed on to the next
administrations. Unlike most documents, which are never passed on, this
one went out of channel and it was passed on. I was delighted, when I went
back into the White House this last time, to see that the book not only still
4. ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR., CAVEAT: REALISM, REAGAN,
(1984).

AND

FOREIGN POLICY 160

2010]

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

829

exists, but it’s very nicely bound, and it’s not only in the Counsel’s Office,
but it’s in every emergency facility and permanently in Air Force One and
Air Force Two. So at least that problem has been met for the time being.
It’s certainly consistent with the Twenty-Fifth Amendment as well.
As we all know, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was not invoked on
March 30. I have read that during that tense afternoon the draft Sections 3
and 4 letters were pulled from my hands and sealed in a safe. That’s not
quite so. Rather, at the request of the Chief of Staff, the papers were stored
in a safe unless and until needed. But think how silly that sounds. It wasn’t
a great secret that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was in play, if you will.
To say that suddenly papers were pulled and stored protectively, as if the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment was non-existent, sounds and is silly.
It is true that we were informed that the bullet had been removed from
the President’s lung after surgery, and an hour later, we were informed that
doctors were very confident of a full recovery. That news quelled any
further thoughts or discussion about invoking the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
until the Vice President returned. He was en route back. Of course, once
he got back, he met with us, in an expanded group in the Situation Room.
The group of us—the Attorney General, the Chief of Staff, and Secretary
Weinberger, and me, but not the Secretary of State, went into the Vice
President’s office. There we discussed whether Section 4 should be
invoked, at that point. The decision was made that it should not be. The
next morning the President was alert. He was joking, writing notes to
people. He met and conducted some very minor official tasks, with the
cameras being there to show that the President was working. The Vice
President met with the senior staff and oversaw routine business.
Some have contended that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment should still
have been under consideration in the course of the ensuing days. The
President recovered gradually and underwent additional procedures. People
presumably were talking about Section 4, or a prompting by the President to
engage in Section 3. But if the Amendment hadn’t been triggered on the
day of the shooting, hadn’t been triggered that evening, it certainly was not
going to be willingly engaged, absent a change in the President’s health, by
the mere virtue of his understandably reduced schedule. The world had
been told he was recovering, and, thankfully, that’s what turned out to be
the case.
Four years later, there would, of course, be more lead time prior to the
President’s medical procedures that we referenced earlier this morning,
which allowed for an orchestrated consideration of necessary provisions for
presidential continuity. We had learned that the President had an intestinal
polyp. The President was scheduled to undergo a colon procedure.
Accordingly, prior to the July 12 procedure, I met with the President, the
Vice President, and the Chief of Staff, and we discussed the implications of
the treatment, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the national command
authority, the President’s wishes regarding the temporary passage of power
if he were to be incapacitated for any length of time. I’m going to come
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back to that, because this will be relevant as we discuss what happened
later.
We all knew that there was a possibility that something more significant
could happen, but as it looked that day, general anesthesia was not going to
be required. The decision was obvious, and the views were unanimous that
the Amendment would not be exercised.
But later that afternoon, on that Friday, the Chief of Staff was informed
that there were some problems with the President’s examination and that
something larger was found and a more significant surgical procedure was
going to be required. So we discussed what needed to be done—how to
contact the Vice President, who at that point would be traveling to
Kennebunkport[, Maine].
At that point, no decision and no
recommendation was made to the President regarding the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, but we were aware of his general reluctance to exercise the
Amendment for anything that he deemed to be a minor period of
inconvenience or incapacitation.
So we had further discussions that night with the Vice President on the
phone and the Attorney General. We agreed that we would meet at the
hospital the next morning. That evening I drafted several options of letters.
One was a clearly expressed Twenty-Fifth Amendment invocation. It had
already been in my book. It was pure vanilla. It just exercised the TwentyFifth Amendment.
Another was a letter that the President would eventually actually sign.
This is what we deemed to be the optional letter. It followed the
Amendment, for all practical purposes, but did not outright invoke it. The
draft letter expressly—and you have probably all read it—disclaimed
invocation of the Amendment—he did not want precedent binding on
anyone privileged to hold the office in the future. I added that language. I
added it because, based on my conversations with him about the TwentyFifth Amendment, both that day and before, I knew there was a serious
reluctance on his part to establish binding precedent on future Presidents for
what he deemed to be minor surgical procedures. He kept talking about, for
instance, “What happens if I have a toothache and have to have a tooth
pulled out? Are you going to tell me to transfer power? I don’t think that’s
what the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was intended to do.”
One can easily think of other reasons why a President would theoretically
be reluctant to turn power over to a Vice President. But that certainly
wasn’t the motivating factor here. Candidly, I can’t think of any situation
in any administration since that day where a President would have had the
need for that kind of concern.
But early the next morning, Saturday, I met with the Chief of Staff at
Bethesda, where the President was being prepped for surgery. We
discussed the drafts. Then we went in and discussed it with the President
and Mrs. Reagan in his hospital room. The President, as I expected, clearly
liked the optional paper, directing the Vice President not solely based on the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, but consistent with his longstanding
arrangement with the Vice President that he would “‘discharge those
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powers and duties in my stead’ commencing with the administration of
anesthesia.”5
The Vice President had been informed of the pending assignment and
was en route back to Washington. The letter was transmitted to Congress,
and the surgical procedure proceeded.
For the benefit of historians, there is no question that the President knew
he was temporarily transferring the presidency. Once he signed it, he
handed it to me and he jokingly directed that I should tell Vice President
Bush that Nancy did not go along with the transfer deal.
The President’s letter concluded that, consistent with the provisions of
Section 3, he himself would then advise Congress when he was able to
resume the duties and discharge his constitutional obligations.
To fill out the story, when surgery was completed, the Chief of Staff, the
Press Secretary, and I went to see the operating surgeon to discuss the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment and to discuss and explain our new dilemma,
mindful that Section 3 makes it clear that it is the President himself who has
to decide when he is able to discharge the duties of the office, even if the
Amendment had not been the actual or, realistically, the sole basis for the
temporary transfer. So our basic question to the doctor was, “How can we
tell if he’s really ready to do this? Not when he says he is, but how can we
really tell?”
The doctor said, “Look, there’s no formula. There’s no set way to figure
this out.”
We discussed it at some length. We came up with the idea of inviting the
President to read the letter to Congress informing them of his determination
that he had the ability now to resume the powers and duties of the office, to
see if he understood it. The doctor said that would be evidence that he was
lucid enough, in fact, to resume the duties of the office.
About two and a half hours after surgery was completed and he was out
of post-op, we went into his recovery room. We had light conversation
with him about what was going on in the world . . . . He seemed lucid. He
was picking up on some subtle points we were making in reference to one
of his earlier movies. As I recall it was from a movie about George Gipp
(the original “Gipper”), in which one of his lines as he was lying in the
hospital was, “Where’s the rest of me?” He picked up on all of it.
We then discussed transfer of power. I handed him the draft letter to
read. He took the letter. As soon as he got it, he held it up and his eyes
started twitching and rolling around and blinking. The Chief of Staff and I
looked at each other and pretty much decided instantly that it was a little
premature for us to discuss this with him. The President noticed our
reaction, and he laughed and reminded us that he didn’t have his glasses or
his contacts on.
He said, “I just can’t read the darn thing.”

5. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
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Then he put his glasses on and he read the letter and we discussed it with
him. But even then, we offered to come back in a couple hours and ask him
to sign it. He said something to the effect of, “Oh, heck no. I don’t want
you to wake me up later. I want to sign it now.”
So we concluded that he was lucid enough to take it back. He, in fact,
signed it, and we transmitted it.
Mind you, there was no reason to rush the President at that point.
Gorbachev had been in office for four months. There were generalized
foreign policy flashpoints, but the Vice President was available and
prepared for the transfer. There was no particular immediate reason to rush
the President back into control, apart from the general perspective that, all
things considered, the public should be assured of the President’s condition
as soon as it could be assured of the President’s condition. On the other
hand, you certainly would want to avoid having to reengage the office and
then later having to transfer it back again. As I say, there was no reason at
that point that we could see not to do it.
The other thing that I would discuss a little: some have questioned
whether it was appropriate for us to have played this role with the President
in resuming his powers, in light of the Amendment’s language that made it
his own conclusion that he was ready to resume his powers. In practice,
I’m not sure how it could have operated any other way. To assume so is
somewhat naïve. I have read some of the critics who have said that we just
assumed the presidential powers ourselves. Whether they are doctors or
nurses or the President’s intimate advisers who come in to the situation,
inevitably there are going to be people making objective determinations as
to whether the President has seemingly sufficiently regained his
consciousness and his wits about him, irrespective of his or her own
conclusion. So the presidential declaration that he or she is fit, I suspect,
will never, in any real sense, stand alone. Thus, the role of any presidential
adviser, on this or other issues, is to evaluate the circumstances for the
President and provide your judgment and your recommendation to the
President. As it turns out, in this instance, when we offered him the
alternative of additional time, the President was very convincing in saying
no.
Certainly one can easily conceive of a scenario—and indeed the writers
of the show 24 have done so very creatively—where the President’s
condition and his own assessment of his condition is uncertain and can be
used as a tool for members of the Cabinet or the Vice President to
manipulate tactical policy determinations. But in any event, thankfully,
nothing of that sort was in the context of that day.
I’ll grant you that if there had been any circumstance along those lines
that have been depicted in 24 or any of these shows, where the President is
in the hospital by virtue of an enemy attack or a pivotal threat is occurring
to the nation at the time, we would not have been the only three people in
that room. There would have been many, many more people contributing
to those recommendations in Bethesda.
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The first official and unambiguous invocation of Section 3 of the
Amendment occurred in June of 2002. They did it without me! Actually, I
joke, because they didn’t—because Al[berto] Gonzales, who was Counsel
to the President, called me. He wanted to know the history of what had
taken place in the hospital room in Bethesda.
The second one was on July 21 of 2007. Both times the President
decided to invoke the Amendment because he was undergoing a routine
colonoscopy, where he would be temporarily and briefly transferring his
powers to Vice President Cheney.
We were talking earlier about how things would go seamlessly. This was
seamless. But let me just elaborate on this for a couple more minutes, just
to give you a flavor for that President’s thinking in this instance.
Now that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment had already been invoked, he
wasn’t breaking the ground. The decision was made to have the procedure
in 2007, when I was there. There was no serious debate about whether it
should be exercised or not, although President G.W. Bush and I did spend
some time on that—he was very curious about the incident before with
Ronald Reagan and why it had been handled the way it had been.
The procedure was done at Camp David. All the security and
communication lines were all pre-set. Once the President was going under
anesthesia, I called the Vice President. We then launched the letter that the
President had signed right before he began the procedure. Once the
operation was over, the Chief of Staff, the National Security Adviser, and I
jokingly donned hospital whites and waited for his eyes to open. I will
leave it to his memoirs to cite his humorous comments at the moment.
Let’s put it that way.
After a rest period, the President took a walk at Camp David. Then we
all had breakfast, because he hadn’t eaten since the day before. When he
was finished, he asked for the papers to sign. He signed it and went off for
a bike ride. It was quite a difference from the last time I had gotten such a
Presidential signature.
What are the takeaways from this long stroll down memory lane?
First, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, as written, doesn’t provide for every
succession contingency. Most of them relate one way or the other to the
Vice President. We have had that discussion and will continue to have it,
but I must tell you that your continuing efforts to identify these ambiguities
and gaps in current constitutional and statutory provisions for continuity are
tremendously important to the country.
Secondly, we have seen that there is a historic reluctance on the part of
Presidents and Vice Presidents when dealing with the potential use of and
their potential role under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, because to exercise
it might trigger signals of personal or national weakness or of personal
ambition. Frankly, I’m not sure there’s a textual remedy for that. I think
we have to accept that this is human nature. We have yet to see how
provisions—namely, Section 4—will operate in reality. Hopefully we will
not have to see that, but we don’t know what would happen there.
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Third, it’s important for us to engage in these discussions so that we do
have recommendations that have been scholarly in their evaluation, in the
calm of debate, not the turmoil of crisis. This is going to be helpful, should
there be an opportunity to amend the existing constitutional amendment and
the statutory regime. However, as a practical matter, we know from history
that unless something catastrophic occurs that gives justification for it and
people seize the moment, as Senator Bayh did—and I guess the moment of
9/11 was an interesting one, but it didn’t affect the continuity of
government at that moment, so it wasn’t as much in the forefront—I think
the likelihood is that what we posit here today is unlikely to be extended.
Finally and most importantly, these episodes that I have recounted today
I hope will instruct us all that no matter how many contingencies are
contemplated, you are never going to get them all. You are never going to
think of everything that could or might happen, so we have to place a layer
of trust in our elected leaders and their advisers, and frankly in individuals
in the press as well, to mind that any procedural gaps in a continuity crisis
will be dealt with integrity and with the nation’s best interest at heart. Even
if there might be an eventual constitutional remedy enacted to cure some of
the defects that we’re talking about today, we are unlikely still to capture
them all. Even in the nation with the most able Constitution among all
men, it will be no greater than the character and the wisdom of the people
that enforce it and are empowered to do so. Thus, I would suggest that our
major goal here today is to provide the guidance in any way, shape, and
form that it may take.
I thank you all very, very much. It’s an honor to be here.

